V-273651

Discussion

The routing header can be used maliciously to send a packet through a path where less robust security is in place, rather than through the presumably preferred path of routing protocols. Use of the routing extension header has few legitimate uses other than as implemented by Mobile IPv6. The Type 0 Routing Header (RFC 5095) is dangerous because it allows attackers to spoof source addresses and obtain traffic in response, rather than the real owner of the address. Secondly, a packet with an allowed destination address could be sent through a Firewall using the Routing Header functionality, only to bounce to a different node once inside. The Type 1 Routing Header is defined by a specification called "Nimrod Routing," a discontinued project funded by Defense Advanced Research Projects Activity (DARPA). Assuming that most implementations will not recognize the Type 1 Routing Header, it must be dropped. The Type 3-255 Routing Header values in the routing type field are currently undefined and must be dropped inbound and outbound.

Check Content

This requirement is not applicable for the DODIN Backbone.

Review the configuration for the command below (which drops all routing-types except 2):

Ipv6 drop routing-type

If the perimeter router is not configured to drop all routing header types other than 2, this is a finding.