V-272078

Discussion

A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or even a rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication for routing updates. However, using clear-text authentication provides little benefit since an attacker can intercept traffic and view the authentication key. This would allow the attacker to use the authentication key in an attack. Since MD5 is vulnerable to "birthday" attacks and may be compromised, routing protocol authentication must use FIPS 198-1 validated algorithms and modules to encrypt the authentication key. This requirement applies to all IPv4 and IPv6 protocols that are used to exchange routing or packet forwarding information; this includes all Interior Gateway Protocols (such as OSPF, EIGRP, and IS-IS) and Exterior Gateway Protocols (such as BGP), MPLS-related protocols (such as LDP), and multicast-related protocols. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000230-RTR-000002, SRG-NET-000230-RTR-000003

Check Content

If EIGRP, RIP, and IS-IS protocols are used (these protocols only support MD5 authentication), this is a finding.

Review the switch configuration using the show bgp and show ospf commands to verify BGP and OSPF. Navigate to Tenants >> {{your_tenants}} >> Networking >> L3Outs >> {{your_L3Out}} >> Logical Node Profiles >> {{your_node_profile}} >> Logical Interface Profiles >> {{your_interface_Profile}>> OSPF|EIGRP|BGP Interface profile.

If authentication protocols that affect the routing or forwarding tables are not configured to use key chain (TCP-AO) authentication with 180 maximum lifetime, this is a finding.