V-273597

Discussion

A rogue router could send a fictitious routing update to convince a site's perimeter router to send traffic to an incorrect or even a rogue destination. This diverted traffic could be analyzed to learn confidential information about the site's network or used to disrupt the network's ability to communicate with other networks. This is known as a "traffic attraction attack" and is prevented by configuring neighbor router authentication for routing updates. However, using clear-text authentication provides little benefit since an attacker can intercept traffic and view the authentication key. This would allow the attacker to use the authentication key in an attack. Since MD5 is vulnerable to "birthday" attacks and may be compromised, routing protocol authentication must use FIPS 198-1 validated algorithms and modules to encrypt the authentication key. This requirement applies to all IPv4 and IPv6 protocols that are used to exchange routing or packet forwarding information; this includes all Interior Gateway Protocols (such as OSPF, EIGRP, and IS-IS) and Exterior Gateway Protocols (such as BGP), MPLS-related protocols (such as LDP), and multicast-related protocols. Satisfies: SRG-NET-000168-RTR-000078, SRG-NET-000168-RTR-000077

Check Content

Review configuration for routing protocol authentication and encryption.

OSPF:

router ospf
 area 0
!
interface ethernet 1/1/1
 ip ospf area 0
 ip ospf authentication hmac-sha-256 key-id 10 key 2 $Nlx9cy1TR31TIS0tfURuXA==
 ipv6 address fd00:12::2/32
!

BGP:

keychain mykeychain tcp
 key-id 1
  password 2 $Uyt9R3NVfURuXH1a
  authentication-algorithm aes-128-cmac
  send-lifetime start 03-05-2024 00:00:00 end 09-01-2024 00:00:00
  no accept-ao-mismatch
  send-id 1
  recv-id 1

router bgp
 local-as xxxx
 neighbor x.x.x.x remote-as 10
 neighbor x.x.x.x ao mykeychain

If OSPF or BGP is configured and does not use authentication/encryption, this is a finding.